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ABSTRACT 
This paper surveys empirical Phillips curve and wage curve 
models for The Netherlands. It provides a simple theoretical 
model with which an appropriate specification for Phillips 
curve and wage curve models can be derived, which reckons 
with labour market tightness and fits into a flow model of 
the labour market. We find that in particular the short term 
unemployment-vacancy ratio and flows from unemployment to 
employment affect the wage formation process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The description of the wage formation process is crucial to models of the 
labour market. In most traditional macroeconomic policy models, wage forma-
tion is explicitly modelled in a wage equation, which includes the influence 
of some measure of unemployment on wages. The empirical relationship between 
wages and unemployment discovered by Phillips (1958) nowadays has a firm 
theoretical foundation. Phelps (1968) has shown how the Phillips curve effect 
can be derived from the behaviour of the firm, whereas in a newer tradition 
trade union behaviour has been shown to imply the so called wage curve effect 
(Oswald, 1982; Blanchflower and Oswald 1989; Graafland 1992). However, 
neither of these theoretical derivations of the specification of the wage 
equation prescribes that (some transformation of) the unemployment rate 
should act as a measure for labour market tightness. The theory allows for a 
much wider set of indicators. Traditional models of the labour market just 
have some measure of unemployment as explanatory variable in the wage 
equation, because it is the only indicator of labour market tightness that is 
endogenous in the model. 
• However, a new approach to modelling the labour market considers labour 
market dynamics by endogenising labour market flows (Blanchard and Diamond 
1992). Most theoretical models of this flow approach to the labour market 
concentrate on equilibrium unemployment and therefore have an implicit 
description of wage formation. Yet, for an empirical model of labour market 
flows, an explicit modelling of wage formation by means of a wage equation is 
more appropriate when the labour market is not considered to be in equilibri-
um in each period. This is the case for the Netherlands in the last decades. 
This paper investigates empirical specifications for the Dutch wage 
equation using alternative measures of labour market tightness, which are 
endogenous in a flow model of the labour market. The next section shortly 
reconsiders the theoretical foundation of the Phillips curve and the wage 
curve. Section 3 surveys the empirical wage equation for the Netherlands, 
whereas we present our own estimates of Phillips curve equations and wage 
curve equations for the Netherlands in section 4. The latter section also 
compares the size of the effect of labour market tightness on wage formation 
according to alternative indicators. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2. LABOUR MARKET DYNAMICS AND WAGE FORMATION 
This section gives the theoretical background of the specification of a wage 
equation, which has an indicator of labour market tightness as explanatory 
variable. The Phillips curve specification is based on the theoretical model 
of Phelps (1968), where the firm is assumed to set the wages. The specifica-
tion of the wage curve is described as outcome of a wage bargaining process. 
Cf. Graafland (1992). 
2.1. The Phillips curve 
We slightly adapt Phelps' (1968) theoretical foundation of the Phillips curve 
in order to obtain an appropriate specification for representing labour 
market dynamics and expectational behaviour. Starting point is a representa-
tive firm, which has a number of unfilled jobs. By offering a higher wage, 
compared to wages paid elsewhere, the firm will try to fill these vacancies. 
It is assumed that the supply of applicants for the vacancies will rise with 
total unemployment. When unemployment is high, the quit rate of current 
employees of the firm drops; it rises with the macro vacancy rate. The 
desired wage differential of the firm is then 
(Wi-w)/w = /x(ur, vr, vr{), (1) 
* 
where flur<0, / iw>0 , /iOT-.>0, tUj is the wage rate the t'-th firm wishes to 
pay, w is the average wage rate of all firms, ur is the macro unemployment 
rate, vr is the macro vacancy rate, vr,- is the number of unfilled jobs of the 
t-th firm. 
Phelps assumes that all firms behave much alike and hence the average 
wage differential will be a function of the unemployment rate and the 
aggregate vacancy rate. 
(w -w)/w = f2(ur, vr), (2) 
where f2ur<^ / 2w>° a^d w ^ t a e average wage rate the firms are willing to 
pay. 
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Next it is postulated that 
w = X[(w -w)/w], 0<A<1, (3) 
where implies the percentage change of the variable involved. This equation 
assumes that each firm expects the wage rate paid by others to be constant 
during the duration of the wage negotiated. Hence, the average wage rate will 
rise (fall) if all firms want to pay a wage higher (lower) than other firms. 
It is assumed that firms in the aggregate adjust their wages only gradually 
towards the average desired differential, represented by the value of the 
constant A. The gradualness might come from the administrative and psychic 
costs of changing wage rates that causes wages to be changed only intermit-
tently or periodically. If these wage negotiations are staggered across firms 
or workers, the average wage rate will move more or less smoothly. Ia 
addition, the uncertainty of the firm whether the "desired" wage differential 
would have the desired effect on turnover costs will induce a cautious, 
gradual response in the individual firm's wage decision. 
Moreover, in order to guess the employment effects of its wage decision, 
the firm will want to forecast wage changes elsewhere. This assumption 
implies an expectations augmented Phillips curve: 
w = we + X[(w -w)/w] = we + \f2(ur,vr) = we+ f3(ur,vr), (4) 
where w is the expected percentage wage rate change, which Phelps assumes to 
be generated by adaptive expectations. 
Li this paper, we assume a different expectations formation process for 
the wage rate. The expected wage rate is specified as a function of lagged 
wages (to.x), consumers and producers prices (pc and py), labour productivity 
(h) and taxes and social premiums paid by employers and employees (tp). Our 
expectations augmented Phillips curve now becomes 
w = /^tLx, Pc, Py, fi, tp) + /3(ur, vr), (5) 
where / 4 j , c>0, hPy<0, / 4 h>0, /4 t J ,>0-
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Equatioa (5) is the startiag poiat of our specification of the wage 
equatioa, which reckons with laboux market dynamics, in the wage formation 
process. Therefore we will consider in more detail the function representing 
labour market behaviour f3. First, we can neglect the effect of vacancies. As 
a matter of fact, Phelps assumed that the vacancy rate is related to the 
unemployment rate and to the percentage change in the unemployment rate. 
Obviously, this simplifying assumption was made in order to arrive at the 
Standard specification of the Phillips curve with unemployment as indicator 
of labour market tightness. However, our summary of Phelps' arguments make it 
clear that this theoretical foundation of the wage equation allows for a much 
wider set of indicators of labour market tightness. So, we will shortly 
review how some of these indicators fit into this theoretical setup. A first 
altemative, which is very much in line with Phelps' original theory, is to 
consider the vacancy rate as the sole indicator in /3 , thereby neglecting the 
effect of unemployment. This is a sort of extreme version of the insider-
outsider theory, developed by, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1986). Another 
possibility is to have the unemployment-vacancy (UV) ratio as determinant of 
wage formation. This ratio can be considered as a measure of the flexibility 
on the laboux market. High unemployment and few vacancies imply an ineffi-
ciently working labour market. 
The insider-outsider theory asserts that only short-run unemployed are of 
interest for the wage decisions of firms. Firms are less inclined to .hixe 
long-term unemployed. Long-term unemployed loose their skills and the ability 
to work. Moreover, they become discouraged to search for new jobs. Hence, in 
this view, the supply of applicants for unfilled jobs, as in (1), does not 
depend on total unemployment, but on the short-run unemployment only. One way 
to represent this is to take the logarithm of the unemployment xate. In 
peiiods of high unemployment, and hence high long-term unemployment, this 
implies that less importance is attached to the effect of unemployment on 
wages compared to periods of low unemployment, i.e., relatively more short 
term unemployed. The same argument applies to the UV ratio as representing 
labour maxket dynamics. On the other hand, in the context of the insider-
outsider theory, it might be more appropriate to just take the numbex of 
unemployed with a duxation of less than twelve months as a pxoxy fox shoxt-
texm unemployment. 
- 5 -
We can also interpret the function fz of equation (5) in a flow context. 
Cf. Blanchard and Diamond (1992). In this interpretation, we stress the 
importance of the flow of persons moving from the reservoir of the employed 
to the reservoir of the unemployed, and vice versa, on the wage decisions of 
firms. A high inflow into unemployment implies an increase in the supply of 
applicants for possible unfilled jobs and hence has a depressing effect on 
the wage rate changes. High inflow into employment has the opposite effect. 
Now equation (5) becomes 
» = h(*>-l, Pc, 2y, k $) + fsiFue, •feu), (6) 
where F ^ and Feri are the flow of persons from unemployment to employment and 
vice versa, respectively. 
We still have to specify the functional forms f3, f4, fs in (5) and (6). 
For reasons of convenience, we assume simple linear models with a flexible 
specification, allowing for a number of distributed lags on all explanatory 
variables. Hence, the operational form of the Phillips curve models we are 
going to estimate is 
</>{L)wt = n + a^pct + cx2(L)j?yt + oc3(L)h°t + océ(L)tpt + ocs{L)Xt + et (7) 
where $(L) = l-E]j=1<pjD', oc^L) = Erj={pi.ijL3, Xt is the vector of variables that 
represent labour market tension and we endogenise to models of labour market 
dynamics. They may consist of, e.g., the (short-term) unemployment rate, 
vacancy rate, (short-term) unemployment-vacancy ratio and possible flows out 
of and into unemployment. Finally, et is a white noise error process. 
2.2. The wage curve 
An alternative way to specify the wage formation process originates from 
Sargan (1964). This tradition derives the wage level from a microeconomic 
theory of wage bargaining. See, e.g., Layard and Nickell (1986), Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1989), Graafland (1992). The outcome of such a bargaining process 
between a representative employee and employer is represented by a general-
ised Nash bargaining solution 
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max. odog[w(u))-«] + (l-a)log[7r(t»)-7r], (8) 
w 
where u'(tü)>0, 7r'(iü)<0, 0 < a < l , u(w)>u, 7r(u;)>7r and u and ir are the utility 
functions of the employee and employer, respectively, which depend on wages. 
The workers' utility is a positive function of the wages, while employers' 
utility is negatively related to the wages. The utility levels u and n are 
the threat point of the worker and employer, respectively, and represent 
their utility obtained during a breakdown in the hargaining process, a is a 
parameter representing the relative bargaining strength of the worker. 
Labour market dynamics enter into this model through the assumption that 
bargaining power is related to internal labour market pressures, like the 
vacancy rate, and external pressures, like (short-term) unemployment. These 
two can be joined in the ÜV ratio. Also the two approximations of flows on 
the labour market introduced above, are capable of representing such pres-
sures. 
The crucial difference of the wage curve resulting from the bargaining 
theory in comparison with the Phillips curve is that here the labour market 
variables affect the wage level, not the wage growth. There is a stable 
relation between the wage level and the variables representing labour market 
dynamics. The location of the wage curve will depend on the other exogenous 
variables in the wage negotiation process. We assume those variables to be 
the same as the exogenous variables of the Phillips curve specification, 
i.e., consumer prices (pc), producer prices (j>y), labour productivity (h) and 
taxes and social premiums (tp). Hence, in log-linear form our wage curve is 
logwt = (A +P1logpct + Pj-ogpyt + /33l°g>»t + P£°&Pt + Ps*t + £m (9) 
where Xt represents the variables of labour market dynamics, be it (short-
term) unemployment, vacancies, UV ratio, or the flows from employment to 
unemployment and vice versa and e l t is a stationary error process. The latter 
assumption implies that when all variables in (9) are nonstationary, in the 
sense that they contain a unit root, these series may be cointegrated. In 
that case equation (9) turns into an error-correction specification. Again 
assuming a flexibly specified autoregressive distributed lag model, we find 
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<p(L)Alogwt = (J,0 + p^tyAlogPct + /32(L)ALogpyt + /33(L)Moght + 
fa(L)£bogtpt + pi(L)AXt - (10) 
7[logu; + d^ogpc + 92logpy + 93logh + O^logtp + ö g X ] ^ + s2t 
where <p(L) = l-E*xl<pjL3, /?,(•£) = r£ml/8yLJ and e2t is a white noise error 
process. 
Note that this complication of moving from the specification in levels to 
an error correction specification is assumed to occur only with a wage curve 
specification. This is because the variables in (9) are integrated of order 1 
(1(1)). On the other hand, the time series variables in the Phillips curve 
specification (7) are already specified as 1(1), as these variables are 
denoted in percentage differences, which can be approximated by the first 
difference of the logarithm of the levels of these variables. Yet, in case 
the variables in (7) were 1(1), the wage equation containing the Phillips 
curve effect could be specified in an error-correction form. This would imply 
that the level of the variables in (7) and therefore the variables in (9) are 
1(2). 
Today labour economists tend to prefer the bargaining theory to Phelps' 
theory of wage setting behaviour by the firm, for the specification of the 
wage equation. That is why, from a theoretical perspective, there is some 
preference to have a wage curve effect specified in the wage equation rather 
than a Phillips curve effect. However, Knoester and van der Windt (1987) have 
derived a Phillips curve specification as in (7), which is based on wage 
bargaining between the unions and the employers' organizations. In their 
model, unions and employers' organizations bargain over wage growth. The wage 
outcome is a weighted average of wage growth claims of unions and wage growth 
offers of employers. Labour market dynamics is introduced by the bargaining 
power of both parties. The bargaining power of the union is assumed to be 
negatively related to the level of (short-term) unemployment. As argued above 
it may be positively related to the vacancy rate. Bargaining power can also 
be interpreted in terms of the ÜV ratio or the flow variables between the 
stocks of employed and unemployed. Furthermore, the other driving variables 
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for the wage growth rate are the same as in (7). Thus, this theory yields a 
specification that is observational equivalent with the one of Phelps (1968). 
3. WAGE EQUATIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
This section surveys empirical wage equations for the Netherlands. In most 
large macroeconomic models in the Netherlands, the wage equation contains a 
Phillips curve effect as indicator of labour market tightness. The rationale 
for this inclusion goes back to the seminal articles of Phillips (1958) and 
Lipsey (1960). 
As derived in the previous section, a Standard Phillips curve model 
relates nominal wage growth to the level of unemployment and a number of 
other explanatory variables, like (consumer) price inflation, growth of 
labour productivity and growth of taxes and social premiums paid by employers 
and employees. In some cases it is also argued to include the growth rate of 
unemployment as an additional explanatory variable to take account of a 
possible negative relation between the wage level and the level of unemploy-
ment. This phenomenon is referred to as the Lipsey-effect. Table I presents 
the estimation results of some recent Phillips curve models for the Nether-
lands. In addition to the symbols introduced previously, we have tpw and tpl 
the total taxes and social premiums paid by employers and employees, respec-
tively. Wage curve models for the Netherlands have only recently been 
estimated. Table II gives some estimation results for wage curve models for 
the Netherlands. 
There is some convergency of the empirical evidence in tables I and II. 
First, in both the Phillips curve and the wage curve models, price increases 
are fully passed on to the wages, as in both tables the elasticity of prices 
to wages is unity. Second, in most models the same applies to the labour 
productivity; in many models there is a unit, or at least a near-unit, 
elasticity between labour productivity and wages. Hence, the wage space, 
which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity, is 
completely filled. This can also be explained on institutional grounds for 
the Netherlands, as was argued by Den Butter and Van de Wijngaert (1992), 
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TABLE I. Phillips curve models for the Netherlands. 
w = oc0 + a.1pc + ocji + CL2tpw + ocjtpt + oc5ur + oc6Aur 
«i <x2 0:3 or4 o;5 a 6 
Knoester (1983) 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.85 -1.68 -5.62 
Groene et al. (1984) 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 -0.25 
Verbruggen (1985) „, 1.00 0.55 1.04 -1.52 
Knoester et al (1987) 1.00 0.69 1.15 0.781' 
v.d.Berg et al. (1988) 1.00 1.09 0.43 0.90 3.232) 
Kuipers et al. (1990) 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.43 6.64X) 
Fase et al. (1990) 1.05 0.85 0.10 0.69 -0.17 
Keus et al. (1991) 1.00 0.81 0.75 0.57 -0.12 -1.14 
Houweling et al. (1992) 1.00 0.65 0.80 0.36 -0.13 -1.03 
1) 2) 
mur = l/u; 'ur = log(l/u). 
no distinction between taxes and social premiums paid by employers and 
employees. 
TABLE II. Wage curve models for the Netherlands. 
Graafland Lever Mulder 
19902) 1990a 1990b 1991 1992 1991 1990 
labour market variables: 
unemployment rate (ur) - - - - -1.19 -1.49 -0.12 
short-term ur -2.90 - -0.64 -
long-term ur -1.77 -0.49 -1.37 -0.63 -
long-term ur/ur - -0.15 - -0.10 -
lay-off rate - -2.01 - -1.20 -
vacancy rate 1.32 1.57 
other variables: 
consumer price 1.00 0.46 -0.06 0.65 0.48 0.78 1.00 
value added price - 0.54 1.06 0.35 0.52 0.22 
labour productivity 1.09 0.83 1.01 0.85 0.71 1.00 0.95 
average tax rate 0.77 0.50 0.29 0.63 
marginal tax rate - -0.11 -
employers' tax rate5) - 0.91 -1.00 0.76 
employees' tax rate - 0.40 -0.57 0.50 
replacement ratio6) - 0.32 0.19 0.27 0.31 0.17 
1
 all coefficients have been reduced to their long-run values to make them 
comparable; 2'Graafland and Huizinga (1990); 'Lever (1991) uses - log( l -u) 
and Mulder i.1990) logu; ratio of long-term and total unemployment; 
log(l-fax); ratio of net government assistance and net average wages. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the estimation and test results for specifications (7) 
and (9) or (10) using quarterly data for the Netherlands. Our modelling 
strategy is to move from a general to a specific specification, where the 
ultimately chosen model should still fulfill some essential statistical 
properties, like absence of residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
and normally distributed residuals. We start with the results for the 
Phillips curve specification and next give the results for the wage curve. 
The sample period is 1970.1 to 1991.IV. In order to give an impression of the 
adequacy of the selected specifications, we also present the correlation 
coëfficiënt R , the residual Standard error S.E. and a number of misspecifi-
cation tests: the LM test of Godfrey (1979) on absence of residual autocorre-
lation, the normality test of Jarque and Bera (1980) and the ARCH test of 
Engle (1982). 
4.1. The Phillips curve 
Table UI presents the estimation and test results of the Phillips curve for 
the Netherlands. Based on previous research on the Dutch Phillips curve, in 
line with the purpose of our research and following the arguments of Den 
Butter and Van de Wijngaert (1992) that the wage space is completely filled 
up in the long run, we have set the coefficients of consumers price inflation 
and growth of labour productivity equal to one. Simplification of (7) 
indicated that we should also include the lagged growth rates of wages, 
consumer prices and producer prices and in most cases, the change in taxes 
and social premiums lagged three periods. 
The specifications differ only in the inclusion of the variables repre-
senting labour market dynamics. We have estimated models with the following 
indicators of labour market tightness: 
the unemployment rate (ur), 
the short-term unemployment rate (stur), 
the vacancy rate (vr), 
the ÜV ratio (uv), 
the short-term unemployment-vacancy ratio (stuv) 
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the flow of unemployment to employment as percentage of the labour force 
(/„e) 
the flow of employment to unemployment as percentage of the labour force 
(ƒ«.)• 
/ u e is the flow of filled vacancies as percentage of the labour force and for 
f
€U is flow of persons moving from employment into 'firing' unemployment, as 
percentage of the labour force. 
First, our results seem to confirm the premise of the insider-outsider 
theory that short-term unemployed matter more in the wage determination 
process than long-term unemployed, as the impact of the short-term unemploy-
ment is larger than the impact of the total unemployment. Moreover, vacancies 
and the UV ratio exert about the same influence on wage changes, as measured 
by their explanatory power. Again confirming the insider-outsider theory, the 
effect of the short-term unemployment-vacancy ratio is larger than that of 
the actual UV ratio. Finally, the two actual flow variables imply that the 
inflow into unemployment is insignificant and that only the flow of filled 
vacancies (/ue) influences the wage rate change. 
Note that all specifications of table III are statistically adequate, as 
none of the diagnostic tests is significant at any reasonable significance 
level. Which specification do we prefer for inclusion into a model which 
fully endogenises labour market dynamics? First, based on theoretical 
considerations, it is in particular the short-term unemployment that influ-
ences the growth rate of the wages. An increase in short-term unemployed 
implies an increase for the firm in the stock of persons able to fulfill the 
vacancies. The long-term unemployed have lost their working skills and 
motivation and may no longer be available to fill the vacancies and hence no 
longer exert a dampening effect on wage changes. On the other hand, also 
vacancies influence wage changes, as our theory of section 3.1 claims. Since 
a specification in which both variables appear separately, yields insignifi-
cant values for the parameter of the vacancies, it therefore seems natural to 
prefer the specification with the combination: the short-term unemployment-
vacancy ratio (stuv). 
Second, if we want to take account of actual flows on the labour market 
to represent labour market dynamics, we should prefer the specification with 
the flows to and from employment and unemployment. Hence, the natural 
- 12 -
specification to prefer is the specification with the flow of unemployment to 
employment as indicator of labour market tightness. 
4.2. The wage curve 
The estimation and test results of the wage curve specification for the 
Netherlands, using quarterly data, are given in table V. Apart from the 
labour market variables that were used in the previous section, we will now 
also include another measure of labour market dynamics, namely the index of 
labour market mismatch (mm), introduced by Layard and Nickell (1986). This is 
the absolute change of the proportion of employees in the production sector. 
The idea is that this index measures the rate at which jobs shift from the 
production sector (a leading sector, as f ar as wage rate determination is 
concerned; cf. Graaf land and Verbruggen, 1993) to the rest of the economy, 
leaving pockets of unemployment in the declining sector(s). 
As discussed in the previous section, we have to test on the presence of 
unit roots in the time series data ia order to distinguish between equation 
(9) and (10). In table IV we give the results of the unit root tests of 
Dickey and Fuller (1981), Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988). 
None of the variables shows solid evidence of stationary, hence we have to 
start with equation (10) and test on the presence of a significant cointegra-
tion relation. We will apply the cointegration test of Boswijk (1992). In all 
cases a significant cointegration relation, as presented in table V, cannot 
be rejected. 
Just as with the Phillips curve specification, we assume that the level 
of the wage space, i.e., the sum of consumer price level and level of the 
labour productivity, is completely filled in the long run. Thus, the coeffi-
cients of consumer prices and labour productivity are set to unity in the 
long run equilibrium part of the model. In order to avoid serial autocorrela-
tion and in order to allow for partial adjustment in the wage formation 
process, we also included lags of the wage rate growth and lagged values of 
the other explanatory variables in (10). 
In the specification of the wage curve, we will again include «r, stur, 
uv, stuv, /„e and also the mismatch variable mm, as an alternative measure of 
labour market tension. Even though the model with mm cannot be rejected by 
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the misspecification tests, this variable does not seem to have a very strong 
effect on the wage rate. The unemployment rate (wr) and the unemployment-
vacancy ratio (uv), are particularly strong explanatory variables. The same 
holds for the flow of unemployment to employment, / u e . 
Hence, as with the Phillips curve models, the specifications we prefer 
are based on theoretical considerations and statistical properties of the 
models, given the fact that the wage curve equation is to be included into a 
flow model of the Dutch labour market. This specification contains both the 
unemployment-vacancy ratio (uv) and the flow of unemployment to employment as 
percentage of the labour force (ƒ„<>). See table V, the last column. 
4.3 Comparison 
Our preference for the selected specifications of the wage curve and the 
Phillips curve is based on both theoretical arguments and on the explanatory 
power of the variable representing labour market tightness. In order to 
compare the size of the effects of labour maTket tightness on wage formation 
according to the alternative specifications, we have conducted an impulse 
response analysis. For a number of equations from tables IE and V, we have 
calculated the short run and long run effects of a shock to the alternative 
indicator of labour market tightness on wage changes, which first corresponds 
to an permanent increase in unemployment of 100,000 persons per year. The 
second shock we consider is a permanent decrease in the number of vacancies. 
In fact the unemployment shock is modelled as an increase in short-term 
unemployed of 25,000 in each quarter over the period 1987.I-1987.W. This 
implies that in 1988 short-term unemployment falls by 25,000 persons each 
consecutive quarter, since in 1988.1, the additional short-term unemployed 
from 1987.1 have become long-term unemployed or have found a job. The same 
applies to the other quarters of 1987, until the old level of short-term 
unemployment is reached in 1988.IV. Note that this assumption implies that 
the change in unemployment is 25,000 persons higher in 1987, than would 
otherwise have been the case. We assume this amount to be evenly spread among 
the flows into and out of unemployment. Hence, Fw falls with 12,500 persons 
from 1987.1 to 1987.IV. The impulse responses for a mimber of quarters are 
listed in table VI, where the columns mentioned in that table refer to the 
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number of the column of table IH or table V, respectively. 
We first conduct this impulse response analysis to the Phillips curve of 
the second column of table m , which contains the short-term unemployment 
rate as indicator of labour market tightness. Due to the increase in short-
term unemployment, the growth of the wage rate falls, reaching its trough 
after six quarters and then moving back to the original growth level. Notice 
that this decrease in wage growth is quite substantial for some quarters. The 
Phillips curve in the fifth column of table IH, contains the short-term 
unemployment-vacancy ratio as indicator of labour market tightness. The size 
of the response to the increase in unemployment is now much smaller, reaching 
its trough after five quarters. Of course, the effect is dampened by the fact 
that short-term unemployment is divided by the vacancies, which remain 
unchanged. In the long run, the variables in this model return to their 
original levels, so the response is zero. The sixth column of table UI, 
presents the Phillips curve with the flow variables as indicators of labour 
market tightness. The size of the responses are more in line with those of 
the previous model. In the long run / u e is slightly lower as the labour force 
has increased with 100,000 persons and hence the wage growth is also lower. 
The responses of the wage curve of the first column of table V, which has 
unemployment and the first difference of unemployment as indicators of labour 
market tightness, are also considerable in size for the third to the sixth 
quarter. The wage curve in column five has the change of the flow of unem-
ployment to employment {Afw) and the short-term unemployment-vacancy ratio 
(stuv) as indicators of labour market tightness. Its response is very similar 
to that of the model in the sixth column of table V, which has Afw and the 
unemployment-vacancy ratio (uv) as indicators of labour market tightness. 
There is a large drop in wage growth in the third quarter, because then Afw 
becomes operative, and a rise in wage growth in the seventh quarter, as then 
/„e returns to its original level. In the model of column 5, the long-term 
effect is virtually zero, as both F M and the short-term unemployment return 
to their original levels. For the model of column 6, the long-term effect is 
larger, as here uv permanently takes on a higher value. 
Next, we turn to a permanent decrease in the vacancies of 12,500 each 
quarter of 1987. From 1988 onwards the number of vacancies is thus 50,000 
lower. This implies that the change in vacancies is 12,500 lower for all 
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quarters of 1987, hence the difference between inflow and outflow of vacan-
cies is -12,500 for each quarter in 1987. For convenience sake, we assume 
this amount to be evenly spread between inflow and outflow, thus for 1987.1 
to 1987.IV, Fu e , the flow of filled vacancies, increases with 6,250. The 
effect of this shock to the Phillips curve and wage curve models mentioned 
before are given in table Vu. 
Since in Standard Phillips and wage curves, vacancies are not considered 
as measure of labour market tightness, a shock to the number of vacancies 
will have no effect on these models. A decrease in vacancies implies that 
firms are inclined to pay lower wages than would otherwise have been the 
case. This is shown by the response of the Phillips curve in the fifth column 
of table m to the shock in the vacancies. See table Vu. The Phillips curve 
of the final column of table Dl has F^, as only measure of labour market 
tightness, which is also affected by the vacancy shock, as we have seen. 
Since the decrease in vacancies over 1987 implies a increase in the flow of 
filled vacancies, the effect of this specification is confined to 1987. The 
wage rate rises slightly by 0.04 percentage points over four quarters. It 
shows, however, that this specification is not very adequate in case of a 
change in vacancies, as it only reckons with the decrease in the flow of 
unemployment into employment, associated with that vacancy change. 
For the wage curve specifications of columns five and six of table V, we 
find a similar pattern in the response, reaching a trough after six quarters 
for both models. In 1987.III, Afwet-i becomes operative causing the initial 
wage rate decrease to become less. lts influence ends in 1988.2, causing an 
additional drop in the wage rate change. The troughs of this quarter can be 
quite substantial. Afterwards, the response starts fluctuating around a new, 
lower, equilibrium level. 
All in all, our simulations show that the measured effect of labour 
market tightness, represented by an increase in unemployment, on wage 
formation is smaller, when we explicitly reckon with various aspects of 
labour market dynamics, as compared to the traditional use of unemployment 
representing the wage curve or Phillips curve effect in the wage equation. 
However, when we look at a decrease of vacancies as indicator of labour 
market tightness, the Standard Phillips and wage curve models do not show any 
reaction. Our specifications that do take account of labour market dynamics 
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are then more realistic. Notice that we have only looked at the effect in the 
wage equation in isolation of the rest of the model. If the wage equation 
were to be included into a fully-fledged model of labour market flows, second 
order effects could magnify the Phillips curve or wage curve effects modelled 
according to the alternative indicators. 
5. CONCLUDING REMAEKS 
This paper empirically investigates the influence of labour market dynamics 
on wage formation. Traditionally wage equations include either a Phillips 
curve or a wage curve effect using unemployment as an indicator of labour 
market tightness. The theoretical foundation of the Phillips curve, which is 
based on wage setting behaviour of the firm, and of the wage curve, which is 
based on bargaining between employers and employees, leaves scope for a wider 
set of indicators of labour market tightness than unemployment. If the wage 
equation is to be included in a traditional macroeconomic model, which does 
not reckon with labour market dynamics and which has (short-term) unemploy-
ment as the sole indicator of labour market tightness, it is obvious that 
(some transformation of) unemployment is to be included as explanatory 
variable in the wage equation. On the other hand, when the wage equation 
forms a part of a model of labour market flows, a number of alternative 
indicators, which are endogenous in the model, should be considered. 
Our empirical estimates for The Netherlands show that some of these 
alternative indicators qualify for inclusion into the wage equation indeed. 
These are the short-term unemployment-vacancy ratio and the flow of unemploy-
ment to employment as alternatives in the Phillips curve specification of the 
wage equation and both the unemployment-vacancy ratio and the flow from 
unemployment to employment in the wage curve version of the equation. Impulse 
response simulations show that not only unemployment, but also vacancies as 
indicator of labour market tightness influence the wage rate, as opposed to 
Standard Phillips and wage curves. 
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TABLE m 
Estimation and test results of Phillips curve equations for the Netherlands, 
with different measures of labour market tension. 
Dependent variable: £Logwt 
constant -.004 
(-0.793) 
.004 
(0.825) ( 
-.019 -.006 
;-5.680) (-1.929) ( 
-.007 -.028 
-2.219) (-5.467) 
^l°Si>ct 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
^ log/ i t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ALogiüt_x -.340 -.364 -.307 -.295 
(-3.368) (-3.612) (-3.146) (-3.095) | 
-.289 -.316 
[-3.096) (-3.324) 
Alogpct.! .520 
(2.675) 
.475 
(2.404) 
.587 
(3.021) 
.522 
(2.633) j 
.573 
[2.976) 
.700 
(3.722) 
A&oght_3 1.09 
(2.152) 
1.30 
(2.736) 
£L°gPyt-l -.355 
(-3.245) ( 
-.380 
-3.436) | 
-.382 -.378 
;-3.385) (-3.368) ( 
-.378 -.324 
-3.392) (-3.018) 
£Logtpt_z .085 
(2.003) 
.088 
(1.960) 
.114 
(2.340) | 
.113 
(2.385) 
sturt_2 -.162 
(-2.216) (• 
-.267 
-3.487) 
vrt-2 .480 
(2.966) 
ui>t_1(*1000) 
( 
-.448 
;-3.095) 
sfuut_i(*1000) 
(-
-.768 
-3.280) 
/uet-l .403 
(2.960) 
R2 
S.E. 
T 
.645 
.0104 
84 
.647 
.0104 
85 
.633 
.0106 
85 
.636 
.0106 
85 
.641 
.0105 
85 
.761 
.0102 
85 
^ ( 1 , 7 5 ) 
* U K ( 5 , 7 1 ) 
1.00 
.772 
.754 
.592 
1.26 
.708 
.705 
.401 
.718 
.439 
.652 
.791 
X&2) .443 .915 .250 2.00 1.65 .733 
FARCH(S,$0) 
.046 
.610 
.203 
.391 
.043 
.582 
1.00 
.420 
.664 
.385 
.001 
.670 
2 
F^JI *S ^e autocorrelation test of Godfrey (1979), xiv k t u e Jarque-Bera test 
on normality and FJ^CJJ is Engle's ARCH test. These statistics indicate the 
distribution under the null hypothesis and the degrees of freedom are between 
parentheses. T is the number of observations used for estimation and testing. 
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TABLE IV. 
Unit root test results 
ADFikf Phillips (1987) Phülips-Perron (1988) 
logu>t 
logPct 
logPyt 
log^t 
logtp t 
wrt 
sturt 
vrt 
uvt 
stuvt 
fuet 
Teut 
mmt 
-3.123, 
-3.042 , 
-2.710 
-3.820, 
-2.360, 
-1.462, 
-1.763, 
-1.978, 
-2.317, 
-2.511, 
-2.693, 
-2.720 
-3.033 
(k=4 
(k=2 
(k=l 
(k=3 
(k=3 
(k=9 
(k=9 
(k=7 
(k=5 
(k=5 
(k=5 
(k=4 
(k=4 
0.272, 
0.217, 
0.181, 
0.056, 
-0.297, 
0.384, 
0.092, 
-2.622] 
-1.991, 
-2.215, 
-0.899, 
0.368, 
-3.989 
-2.607, 
-1.801, 
-2.112, 
-2.370, 
-3.174, 
-1.845, 
-3.538, 
-6.955 , 
-4.009 , 
-4.375 , 
-8.388 , 
-11.34, 
-12.66 
unit root hypothesis not rejected at 5 percent significance. 
ADF stands for augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Cf. Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
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TABLE V. 
Estimation and test results of wage curve equations for the Netherlands, with 
different measures of labour market tension. 
Dependent variable: Alogwt. 
constant -.318 
(-2.037) 
-.277 
(-1.679) 
-.198 
(-1.246) 
-.176 
(-1.005) 
-.109 
(-0.705) 
-.189 
(-1.184) 
Alogw^ -.357 
(-4.008) 
-.382 
(-3.803) 
-.378 
(-3.730) 
-.375 
(-3.662) 
-.397 
(-4.088) 
- .401 
(-4.201) 
^ log^ct- i .986 
(4.677) 
.633 
(3.584) 
.673 
(3.784) 
.547 
(3.050) 
.627 
(3.674) 
.586 
(3.480) 
^ logpyt . ! -.239 
(-2.336) 
Aloght_3 1.05 
(1.764) 
Alogtpt_3 .202 
(5.169) 
.162 
(3.262) 
.145 
(2.997) 
.103 
(1.856) 
.154 
(3.326) 
.176 
(3.703) 
Aurt_2 -1 .44 
(-4.361) 
Ammt 5.45 
(1.451) 
Afuet-2 .907 
(2.865) 
.942 
(3.031) 
* 
\ogrwht_! -.071 (-2.079) 
-.088 
(-2.521) 
-.073 
(-2.122) 
-.065 
(-1.700) 
-.055 
(-1.640) 
-.070 
(-2.067) 
logPyt-l -.027 
(-3.608) 
-.029 
(-3.873) 
-.026 
(-3.257) 
-.030 
(-4.252) 
-.028 
(-3.937) 
w,_i -.210 
(-5.296) 
U Ü ^ I O O O ) -.493 
(-2.794) 
-.339 
(-1.827) 
-.480 
(-2.868) 
s«uvt_i(*1000) -.679 
-2.465) 
-.623 
(-2.359) 
R2 
S.E. 
T 
.750 
.0094 
85 
.698 
.0103 
85 
.692 
.0104 
85 
.717 
.0101 
84 
.723 
.0099 
85 
.732 
.0097 
85 
*U*(1,72) 
F^e(5,68) 
.065 
.486 
.883 
.454 
.796 
.426 
.317 
1.03 
1.53 
.677 
1.29 
.683 
X^(2) 
FARCH^M) 
FARCH&W) 
.258 
.133 
1.31 
.349 
.117 
.105 
.542 
.143 
.126 
.032 
.032 
.322 
1.56 
.313 
.074 
1.32 
.743 
.170 
logrwht = logtüt - logpct - loght. 
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TABLE VI. Ef f ects of a permanent increase in unemployment on wage growth f or 
a number of quarters (q), in percentage points. 
Effect af ter l q . 2q. 3q. 4q. 5q. 6q. 7q. 8q. 12 q. 16 q. 20 q. 
Phillips curve: 
column (2) .0 .0 -.12 -.23 -.34 -.46 -.33 -.21 .03 .02 .02 
(5) .0 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.11 -.09 -.06 -.03 .0 .0 .0 
(6) .0 -.10 -.11 -.12 -.12 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02 - .02 -.02 
wage curve: 
column (1) .0 -.08 -.72 -.58 -.68 -.67 -.06 -.28 -.24 -.24 -.25 
(5) .0 -.02 -.26 .02 -.12 -.04 .18 -.09 -.01 -.01 -.01 
(6) .0 -.02 -.26 .04 -.10 -.04 .17 -.13 -.04 -.04 -.05 
TABLE VIL Ef f ects of a permanent decrease in vacancies on wage growth f or a 
number of quarters (q), in percentage points. 
Effect after l q . 2q. 3q. 4q. 5q. 6q. 7q. 8q. 12q. 16q. 20q. 
Phillips curve: 
column (2) .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 
(5) .0 -.07 -.11 -.23 -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 -.08 -.32 -.19 -.34 
(6) .0 .0 .04 .04 .04 .04 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 
wage curve: 
column (1) .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 
(5) .0 -.05 .04 -.20 -.77 -.79 -.64 -.43 -.18 -.12 -.24 
(6) .0 -.09 -.01 -.30 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 -.70 -.28 -.19 -.38 
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DATA APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
The quarterly data are mainly taken from the OECD, Main Economie Indicators 
(MEI). Yearly data, which were later interpolated were mainly obtained from 
the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB), Lange Reeksen (LR). Interpolation 
was done by means of a third order polynomial function, cf. Hassink and 
Broersma (1993). The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics is abbreviated to CBS. 
w: index of hourly rates in manufacturing 
source: OECD, MEI. 
pc: price index of total consumption 
source: OECD, MEI. 
py: price index of total output 
source: OECD, MEI. 
h: measure of labour productivity of the firm sector, based on a 
weighted average of actual labour productivity, with weights 0.3 in 
period t, 0.5 in period 0.5 in period t-\ and 0.2 in period t-2. 
Interpolated. 
source: CPB, LR. 
tp: social premiums of employers and employees taken together, as percen-
tage of gross wage costs of the firm sector. Interpolated. 
source: CPB, LR. 
ur: unemployment as percentage of the total labour force ( = employment and 
unemployment) 
source: OECD, MEI. 
stur: unemployment rate with a duration shorter than one year, defined as 
u r -u r4 , where ur4 is the unemployment rate with a duration longer 
than one year. 
source: ur4: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
vr: vacancies as percentage of total labour force. The data were taken 
from the OECD, MEI. To correct for the decline of the share of 
vacancies notified to the Public Employment Offices, we used 
corrected vacancy data for the eighties. These data are corrected 
using Information from the CBS vacancy surveys. The CBS vacancy 
surveys are from October 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, September 1984, 
January 1986, 1987, 1988. By interpolating, we calculated the average 
share of notified vacancies for the years 1980-1987. We assumed that 
for the period 1961-1979, this share was equal to the share of 1980. 
Fu e : we used yearly data on vacancy flows to the Public Employment Office 
of the period 1971-1978 from Hartog (1980) to calculate average 
vacancy durations (duration = stock/flow). For 1980-1987, we used CBS 
vacancy survey data and applying the method described in van Ours and 
Ridder (1991). The average vacancy duration of 1979 by interpolating 
the yearly durations of 1978 and 1980. By interpolating the yearly 
data, we calculated quarterly duration data. Finally, we calculated 
vacancy flows as the quotiënt of vacancy stocks and vacancy durations. 
From 1987 to 1991, actual data on vacancy flows were obtained from 
- 25 -
the CBS, Sociaal Economische Maandstatistiek. 
mm: defined as \empmfgt-empmfgt_1\lemp, where emp is total employment in 
thousand persons of wage earners and salaried employees. Yearly data 
from 1971-1987, are obtained from the OECD, Labour Force Statistics. 
Quarterly data from the CBS for 1984-1987 were used to determine 
quarterly fluctuations in employment. This quarterly pattem was then 
imposed on the yearly data. Data for 1988-1991 were directly observed 
from CBS, Sociaal Economische Maandstatistiek. Empmfg is the employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector, taken from the CBS, National 
Account Statistics and interpolated. Cf. Hassink and Broersma (1993). 
Feu: Flow of persons out of employment into unemployment, due to firing. 
Or the inflow of persons in unemployment insuran.ce (WW). Interpolated 
source: Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale verzekering-
en, 1992. 
- 26 -
